Free TON Whitepaper

Предлагаю рассмотреть следующее решение по токеномике TON Crystal:

  1. Остановить эмиссию токена
  2. Залочить 1 млрд. токенов под стейблкоин NOT
  3. Залочить 1 млрд. токенов на DeFi программы и фарминг
  4. 2 млрд. токенов TON Crystal - СЖЕЧЬ

красиво, а валидаторы на комиссию сети будут жить

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What do you think about the latest version of WhitePaper?

“Every masterchain block, a random set of Verifiers on all Free TON Workchain will perform a sampling”
It should be “on each/every Free TON Workchain”

Edit: actually, the whole paragraph is very ambiguous

“Every masterchain block, a random set of Verifiers on all Free TON Workchain will perform a sampling by requesting a chunk corresponding to the data committed to different DriveChain blocks written into the Masterchain block corresponding to a sequence number of a chunk calculated from a signed by that validators private key hash of a masterchain block (RND mod X, where X is the number of validators in the DeDrive)”.

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I think the DriveChain should support changes that do not require upload as well. Like copying a file using a smart contract instruction. Otherwise, how would you perform a PR merge in DeGit?

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Correct me if i’m wrong, as i understand reader should be able to understand what is written in this paper even if she is not familiar with original TON papers written by N. Durov.

In that case, some parts are missing (TVM description, FreTON Networking etc.). Should we expect them to appear in this paper?

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Great work. Right way to go.

you just rewrite the file. it is technically unfeasible to support partial file updates.


It seems to me that the current Soft Majority Voting (SMV) mechanism does not completely align with meritocracy, community and decentralization values and introduces vulnerabilities to the whole protocol.

The key idea of SMV is that any token holder can vote with the power proportional to the amount of TON they have. If members don’t vote, it is assumed that they are neutral. As a result, the tokens of these neutrals are very likely to be exposed to vote-buying. Given the low turnout in on-chain governances on average in almost all crypto projects and protocols, Free TON is not likely to be different and these neutrals will have incentive to sell their voting power in some ways.

“This is because of the tragedy of the commons among small-holders: each small-holder has only an insignificant influence on the outcome, and so they have little incentive to not be lazy and actually vote. Even if there are rewards for voting, there is little incentive to research and think carefully about what they are voting for.” - Buterin, Moving beyond coin voting governance.

Furthermore, I suspect that as of now the ratio of the protocol participation to the amount of TON at hands is low and can be improved dramatically. For example, how much have validators participated in the protocol except running the nodes and how many tokens they won? How many community members participated in the contests and how many tokens they won? What are the answers to the above questions for Initial Participants? Are these ratios fair?

I think the community should allow voting through SMV for only those who participated in contests with the voting power proportional to some combination of the number of contests and the maximum amount of tokens won. Also, square root voting can contribute to more governance decentralization. Of course, everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler.

The benefits of new voting mechanism:

  1. This aligns more with meritocracy values as voting power will be in the hands of those who contributed and are interested the most. Who ultimately should care about protocol, speculative passive token holders or people who are more knowledgeable about, actively using and developing it? Given the current amounts of tokens at hand, it will be very hard and long to achieve the decentralization of governance compared with the mechanism I suggest.
    Otherwise, we have the white paper that is likely to only entrench current top holders and the protocol will continue to be run by initial participants and validators but not the most active members of the community.

  2. This new mechanism introduces the incentive to increase the participation in the contests, which is the only crucial factor that can benefit the Free TON in the long term according to the current paradigm.

  3. This minimizes the likelihood of a vote-buying attack. See examples:

  • The party that will build TON wrapper (not based on depool), launch a successful defi product and attract $1B WILL NOT be able to have the voting power proportional to the amount of TON wrapped.

  • Also, the crypto exchanges holding the large amount of tokens will have no voting power over the protocol and will not be exposed to vote-buying.

  • I think there can be many examples of vote-buying attacks. When we will have some lending products, the party can borrow TON to do something destructive through governance and have almost no risks. These situations can be really dangerous given the large capitalizations of other protocols.

  1. Finally, we can boast even more regarding fairness and fair launch of Free TON. Going deeper with meritocracy values over governance makes the protocol fairer, and more professional developers teams will be more likely to join.

See already existing issues of token based governance voting:

  1. Moving beyond coin voting governance
  2. Uniswap proposal under fire for enabling Dharma to ‘take over governance’
  3. Hostile takeover of Steem or how to rig on-chain voting by colluding with exchanges

I do not insist that this is the final solution and whether it is right. It is the idea that if we are true cypherpunks that cite The Anarchist Handbook and strive to “use crypto to minimize coercion, and maximize the efficiency and reach of the main non-coercive coordination mechanism available at the time: private property and markets”, I consider that we as the community should pay attention to.


I address Buterin argument in the latest version of the WP draft as follows:

In his recent work “Moving beyond coin voting governance” Vitalik Buterin identifies vote buying as a major threat to the decentralized on-chain coin voting governance model. It describes at length a possibility of an attack on a governance system by an automated smart contract that auctions voting rights in exchange for some tokens. The SMV protocol is a unique voting mechanism proposed by Pavel Prigolovko, optimized for low participation. It is not a simple token holders voting solution. In fact, by addressing a low participation problem it also has other implications. Remember that in SMV each negative vote increases the decision passing threshold. Therefore the attacker will run into ever increasing cost of vote buying because the honest participants’ negative votes have more voting power. In an important decision the attacker may need to buy 75% or more of all tokens for the decision to pass. In effect this is a form of quadratic voting already.


@Mitja congratulations! Ran out of superlatives when reading through the chapters! Very very very impressive body of work!

  1. Interesting way to bring three topics into one - the DAO, MTD and POS. But poses a few challenges
  • MTD partially solves the dilemma of (promised) value through pre-token sales to validators versus a reward based on contribution and the elimination through competition on the survival of the fittest. Suspect would be a contentious point for debt for as long as there are human subjectivity involved.
  • nevertheless it does address the topic of the behavior of the Free TON not moving wildly in either direction due to the association of labor (value add) that the community has obtained most of the tokens, and hence wouldn’t want to re-seller it lower than a certain value which would in turn erode their personal value add.


  • The DAO/sub-governance (BFTG) along with the sub-gov driving TIPs is interesting but not mentioned.

  • The topic on decision to pick PoS as the consensus protocols was not explored in chapter 1 or the other chapters. Would be interesting as a reader to understand the considerations behind not picking PoW (that is obvious) but why not the other ones during that time in 2018/2019, there were a few other protocols being discussed.
    A (Short) Guide to Blockchain Consensus Protocols - CoinDesk

  • the topic on MTD feels like a topic that should placed after “Governance” and “Economy” as some of the concepts and ideas overlaps.

  1. claiming that the by-product of an ICO or token sale is a potential exit scam might be a little too harsh. perhaps suggesting replacing it with token day trade speculators.

  2. TON native cryptocurrency - what type of token does it want to represent? Similar to the discussion on the function of money? The new function of money can be either/or, or all of the above. We would have to pick our arguments carefully to not fall into the same trap of trying to be all of the above.

  1. The “DeValue” token argument - How we perceive and use money varies in different day-to-day decisions. We can’t mix it all up and assume that there is no value in money. We transact using money to address the various needs and wants based on the Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (although the digital economy, safety and sense of belonging might have different order but still goes by needs over wants). Only when it comes to investing for long term, we start putting things like NPVs and NFVs into the true value of money as a medium of storage.

  2. I also believe that the inflation to the actual cost/value of a service or product is also driven by:

  • scarcity of a product or service
  • validity of the products or services (behavior might change on the digital space)
  • fees/tax by intermediaries and governments.
  • etc…
    (disclaimer: not a qualified economist to be able to accurately comments, but suggest more consultation or peer review for this section).

I am having a great time reading the whitepaper, and suggest that this could be taken up by PhD students at the universities (another contest for the professors at the Universities to take it up as a field for future study) to ensure that this body of knowledge is properly documented.


Hmm, coming to think of it, it’s possible to use snarks if you want to prove a modification follows certain rules:)

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Or Starks if you know how to build constructions for arbitrary computations

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An : Hi Zehart, could you explain (or give some links) what is “the dilemma of value”, “potential exit scam” and “the same trap of trying to be all of the above” ?

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Recent ICO exit scams

Labour theory of value

Value creation examples

Trying to be all of the above…
The value of a blockchain vs a cryotoasset has different facets and definition of function attached to it therefore giving it a unit for transaction, storage of value or for records.

Hope that helps @annn


Could you tell if it is the right link to read on the Arbitrary computations?
Arbitrary-precision arithmetic - Wikipedia.

This white paper is going to be one hell of a literature!

If I were to take on my PhD, this white paper would form the topic!!


To emulate Turing machine


You write “WorkChains <…> share the same block and consensus structures”, why shoud the consensus structure be the same? If a transaction is approuved by the two sets of validators based on different consensus, the transaction couldn’t be accepted?

I see I was wrong, only the TON consensus is important: WorkChain validators will <…> produce the same TON consensus guarantees for the Ethereum network completely disregarding this network’s own security assumptions.

Then you write: “as both would run in parallel”, does it mean that TON and Ethereum would run in parallel “making it in a way even more secure”, even if the Ethereum consensus doesn’t matter?